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Abstract 
In a pair of studies, we examine lay people’s judgments about how hypothetical cases involving child 
custody after divorce should be resolved. The respondents were citizens called to jury service in 
Pima County, Arizona. Study 1 found that both male and female respondents, if they were the judge, 
would most commonly award equally shared custody arrangements, as advocated by most fathers’ 
groups. However, if the predivorce child care had been divided disproportionately between the par-
ents, this preference shifted, slightly but significantly, toward giving more time to the parent who 
had provided most of that care, consistent with the Approximation Rule advocated by the American 
Law Institute. Moreover, respondents judged that the arrangements prevailing in today’s court and 
legal environment would award equal custody considerably less often, and would thereby provide 
much less parenting time to fathers, than the respondents themselves would award. Study 2 found 
that respondents maintained their strong preference for equally shared custody even when there are 
very high levels of parental conflict for which the parents were equally to blame, but awarded sub-
stantially less time to the culpable parent when only one was the primary instigator of the parental 
conflict. The striking degree to which the public favors equal custody combined with their view that 
the current court system under-awards parenting time to fathers could account for past findings that 
the system is seriously slanted toward mothers, and suggests that family law may have a public 
relations problem. 
 
Keywords: custody, shared custody, equal custody, approximation rule, moral intuition 
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When parents divorce, their children can no longer live with both of them. Perhaps they 
see each parent often enough to maintain a close connection with both; perhaps not. Lo-
gistical as well as personal barriers arising from the failed parental relation may make it 
difficult to achieve an optimal resolution of the postseparation custodial arrangements. 
When parents cannot agree on these arrangements, courts decide what they will be. In the 
United States, as well as most of the Western world, the usual rule today directs courts to 
make the custody allocation that is “in the child’s best interests.” Under this Best Interests 
Standard (BIS), “for the first time in history, custody decisions were to be based on a con-
sideration of the needs and interests of the child rather than on the gender or rights of the 
parent” (Kelly, 1994, p. 122). The BIS is generally regarded as egalitarian, fair, and simple. 
It is also seen as flexible (Chambers, 1984; Warshak, 2007), permitting courts to customize 
its decisions to take proper account of the varying facts of every case, rather than impose 
a one-size-fits-all rule. 
Nonetheless, the BIS has also been heavily criticized. The classic critique, by leading 
legal scholar Robert Mnookin (1975), argued that it gave judges unconstrained discretion, 
permitting them to decide custody disputes by applying their personal values about the 
proper approach to child-rearing. Chambers (1984) notes these values inevitably vary from 
judge to judge; Finley and Schwartz (2007) note they also vary from parent to parent. Not 
only judges but also parents will disagree on what future one wants for the child, whether 
the goal is a child who is religious or freethinking, spirited or compliant, aggressive or 
modest, creative or conventional (Ellman, 1999). And those choices involve values and be-
liefs as much, or more, than facts. 
A second but related criticism of the BIS is that its lack of specificity makes judicial de-
cisions in custody disputes unpredictable, putting the more risk-averse party at a disadvantage 
in custody negotiations. For example, Woodhouse (1999) wrote, “this unpredictability en-
couraged parents to litigate custody disputes rather than settle them” (p. 820). It should be 
noted that, while the debate is heated, critics cite little evidence that the BIS in fact causes 
such difficulties. 
Finally, because the highly discretionary nature of the BIS makes meaningful appellate 
review of trial judge decisions nearly impossible (Ellman 1999), it seems to heighten the 
chance that although gender-neutral in form, it will be not gender-neutral as applied, at 
least by some trial judges. To the extent judges might share the same gender stereotypes 
(such as that children belong with mothers), the entire system could be biased. Studies 
over the past few decades have indeed found that mothers receive primary residential cus-
tody in the great majority of cases, 68–88%; primary father custody is rare (8–14%); and 
equal residential custody in the U.S. has also been rare until recently (only 2–6% of fami-
lies) (Argys et al., 2007; Braver & O’Connell, 1998; DeLusé, 1999; Emery, 1994; Fox & Kelly, 
1995; Logan et al., 2003; Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992; Nord & Zill, 1996; Saluter & Lugaila, 
1998; Seltzer, 1990). The Arizona jurisdiction we study here has comparable figures: De-
Lusé (1999) found that of ~350 couples divorcing in 1996, the mother obtained primary 
residential custody in 78% of the cases, the father in 12%, and the parents jointly in 6%.1 
Nonetheless, whether this imbalance is in fact because of judicial gender bias is ques-
tionable. It could easily result from other factors. For example, perhaps many divorcing 
spouses agree to maternal custody because they both believe it is appropriate; or, mothers 
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are favored in judicial decisions because they in fact usually perform more parenting tasks 
than fathers and thus appear more suitable to a court on this basis rather than from a gen-
der preference. In this absence of clear evidence establishing or refuting gender bias by 
courts, the matter is, hardly surprisingly, often debated (e.g., Tippins, 2001; Warshak, 1996). 
This article has no evidence to offer in that debate, and for that reason will not enter into 
it. Nor is it our purpose here to compare the merits of the BIS to the merits of other possible 
rules. We did not seek and do not have any data to show whether the BIS works well or 
poorly, or whether other possible rules are better or worse. Nor did we seek to measure 
how judges decide custody cases. 
Our purpose was instead to explore lay perceptions, intuitions and values about physi-
cal custody. (Our inquiry concerns only residential or physical custody, i.e., where the child 
lives, as opposed to legal custody, i.e., who has decision-making rights with respect to the 
child. We also synonymously refer to the parenting time with each parent.) Whatever the 
objective truth about judicial decision-making, several studies have shown that the public 
has the widespread perception that the custody process is heavily biased in favor of moth-
ers. Thus, Braver and O’Connell (1998) report that divorcing parents themselves, both 
mothers and fathers, feel the current rule, as applied, favors mothers. Further, Braver, Cook-
ston, and Cohen (2002) found that even experienced divorce attorneys perceive a strong 
bias towards mothers in the application of the current legal climate. Finally, Fabricius et 
al. (2010) report that 83% of the general public perceives a “slant” toward mothers in “the 
divorce system,” and only 16% see it as unbiased. 
Why does the public hold these opinions? Does the lay person reason in certain ways 
that predispose him or her to such judgments? How do the custody outcomes or processes 
preferred by lay people differ from those preferred by judges or divorce professionals, and 
what are the implications of those differences? These are the questions the current study 
was designed to help answer. 
 
Why Decision-Makers Need to Have Accurate Information about Lay Intuitions 
Concerning Custody 
 
While we would certainly not argue that policy should attempt to slavishly conform to 
public opinion for any public policy, much less custody allocation rules, we also contend 
it should not be ignored and needs to be well understood (Posner, 2002). The history of 
Anglo-American family law clearly shows that custody standards have changed over time 
in synchrony with the changes in cultural norms about families and parenting. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, most American courts assumed that “children will be 
best taken care of and instructed by the innocent party” (Bishop, 1852). It made sense at 
that time to allocate primary custody to the presumably morally superior parent who had 
not caused the divorce. By the middle of the 20th century, however, the dominant view 
was that, while divorce was often unfortunate, it was not grounds for assigning moral 
blame (Schneider, 1985). That cultural shift led to many American courts adopting the 
“tender years” doctrine favoring mothers as the custodian for young children. As one court 
explained in 1938, the maternal preference “needs no argument to support it because it 
arises out of the very nature and instincts of motherhood; nature has ordained it” (Krieger 
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v Krieger, 1938). Another court observed “there is but a twilight zone between a mother’s 
love and the atmosphere of heaven” (Tuter v. Tuter, 1938). A gender-based view dominated 
the law until quite recently. Until 1974 Arizona’s statutes stated: 
 
As between parents adversely claiming custody or guardianship, neither parent 
is entitled to it as of right, but, other things being equal, if the child is of tender 
years, it shall be given to the mother. If the child is of an age requiring education 
and preparation for labor or business, then to the father (Porter v. Porter, 1974). 
 
As these norms and parenting values changed, so did the custody rules reflecting them. 
Thus, modern courts describe the older gender-based rules of thumb as based on “out-
dated stereotypes” (Pusey v. Pusey, 1986). Prevailing cultural norms not only affect the views 
of judges and legislators about the choices that good parents should make, they also affect 
the choices divorcing parents actually make about the allocation of custodial time they 
seek and feel able to provide. Custody decisions, in other words, are unavoidably driven 
in important part by value choices. 
For any law strongly related to societal values (such as custody laws, but also including 
laws in many other venues), policy-makers need to have an accurate portrayal of current 
cultural norms and sentiments, even if they believe an alternate rule or norm is preferable, 
for several reasons. First, officials will have difficulties with enforcement of and compli-
ance with any law that seems wrong or unfair to many people. Such laws are also more 
likely to lead to appeals and deviations, and are more unstable, likely to be retracted, over-
turned or modified. Second, policymakers ought to be concerned about maintaining rules 
that conflict with lay intuitions about what is right, for they may lead to general disdain 
for the court or the rule-makers (which rely on respect), as generally felt now for family 
court (Fabricius et al, 2010; Kline Pruett & Jackson, 1999). In situations where the policy-
makers believe the public understanding is incorrect or naïve, they may wish to consider 
an effort to sell a skeptical public on the “correct” view to help implement it more success-
fully. Third, history teaches that policy-makers need particularly strong justifications to 
keep in place rules that have become deeply unpopular or run contrary to lay intuitions 
about what is right; this is particularly true when the policy-maker is an elected official. 
And scholars should be interested in changes in public understandings of appropriate pa-
rental practices because, among other things, they are likely to influence policymakers as 
well. 
Rather than relying on their fallible intuitions about what the cultural norms are, policy 
makers are recently more interested in scientifically valid inquiries into the public’s judg-
ments and reasoning. Indeed, scientific advances in polling are part of the reason that polling 
data occupy such a prominent place in today’s policy arenas. Inquiries into lay intuitions 
and judgments have led to a comparatively voluminous empirical literature in other areas 
of law such as tort (e.g., Wissler et al., 1997) and criminal law (e.g., Thomas & Hogue, 1976). 
Curiously, though, despite the clear fact that family law policy is and must be to some 
extent compatible with current cultural values, very few studies (other than those cited 
herein) concern the layman’s thinking about family law issues generally or about child 
custody in particular. Thus, it seemed important to us to advance such an exploration. 
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To further ground the inquiry, we considered two competing modern custody pro-
posals that have been spurred by dissatisfaction with the BIS. These rules of thumb would 
constrain or modify the application of the BIS and have the advantage, according to their 
advocates, of providing clearer guidance to decision-makers without sacrificing the child’s 
well-being as the most important criterion for deciding custody disputes between parents. 
These two proposals are the Approximation Rule and an Equal Custody presumption. 
 
The Approximation Rule 
 
The Approximation Rule, proposed by the American Law Institute in the Principles of the 
Law of Family Dissolution (American Law Institute, 2002), states a presumption (§2.90) that 
ordinarily courts “should allocate custodial responsibility so that the proportion of custo-
dial time the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion of time each par-
ent spent performing caretaking functions for the child before the parents’ separation.” 
In other words, the time a child should spend with each parent postdivorce should usu-
ally approximate the time spent with each parent before the divorce. The ALI provides, 
however, that the court may depart from the Approximation Rule “to the extent necessary 
to achieve” any one of eight listed objectives. Most of the eight exceptions are meant to 
allow the court to make a different custodial allocation whenever there is clear evidence 
that departure from the presumptive allocation of custodial time is in the child’s interests. 
Examples are cases in which the presumptive allocation “would harm the child because of 
a gross disparity in the quality of the emotional attachment between each parent and the 
child or in each parent’s demonstrated ability or availability to meet the child’s needs.” 
The ALI recommendation thus seeks to strike a balance between a mechanical rule that 
allows no consideration of how the child’s interests are affected by facts peculiar to the 
case at hand, and a rule like BIS that allows virtually unlimited discretion to the trial judge. 
Proponents (Emery, 2007; Kelly & Ward, 2002; Maccoby, 2005; O’Connell, 2007) believe 
that in the majority of cases, the Approximation Rule presumption will yield the principle 
benefit of providing a predictable result (less custody litigation) without the downside of 
gender bias or the imposition in some cases of inapt arrangements that are not good for 
the child. 
Others (e.g., Lamb, 2007; Riggs, 2005), however, are highly critical of the Approximation 
Rule, seeing a number of potential disadvantages. For example, Warshak (2007) claims it 
does not take into consideration the fact that there will be radical changes to the parenting 
patterns in the family after divorce in any event and that it does not consider parenting 
considerations that cannot be measured or linked to time spent care-taking, such as provid-
ing a role model or moral guidance. While only one state’s legislature (West Virginia) has 
adopted the ALI language verbatim, courts in some other states have cited provisions of it 
with approval. 
 
Equal Custody Presumption 
 
An Equal Custody Presumption, advocated by most fathers’ rights groups, would provide 
that the child should spend about equal time living with each parent after divorce, absent 
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facts that make it unwise or impractical. In the United States, only the District of Columbia 
currently has written into statute a joint physical custody presumption that applies even if 
one parent objects (Family Law in the Fifty States Case Digests, 2008). In the remaining 
American jurisdictions, equal physical custody is currently almost never ordered over ei-
ther parent’s objection (unless the objection is found to be in “bad faith” or for the explicit 
purpose of defeating the other parent’s relationship to the child; Douglas, 2006; Ellman et 
al., 2010). In fact, most states do not even allow judges to order it if either parent objects; in 
effect, either parent can veto it. Australia, under the Family Law Amendment (Shared Pa-
rental Responsibility) Act 2006, is currently the only nation in which the courts have a 
“positive duty” to consider whether an equal time arrangement is in the best interests of 
the child and reasonably practicable (Parkinson, 2010). 
Although equal residential custody in the U.S. thus remains uncommon, its frequency 
is clearly increasing. While (as reported above) DeLusé (1999) found that 6% of the custody 
decrees in a 1996 random sample of Arizona cases had essentially divided parenting time 
equally, by 2008, Venohr and Kaunelis found that fully 22% did so in a comparable Arizona 
random sample. Such changes may explain why some have proclaimed that we are today 
in an “era of shared care,” although the published evidence suggests that equal residential 
custody awards remain in the distinct minority. 
Of course, primary residential custody does not mean exclusive residential custody. Ab-
sent unusual circumstances, the other parent retains a right of access to the children after 
separation. Normally, then, a child will therefore live at least some of the time with the 
parent who is not allocated primary residential custody, with this “visitation” (or “parent-
ing time”) schedule being one of the issues the parents and ultimately the court must re-
solve. The amount of parenting time awarded to fathers has clearly been increasing in the 
last decade or two. While the “standard visitation” routinely awarded from about 1970–
1990 was “every other weekend,” amounting to about 14% of the child’s time with the 
father (Kelly, 2007), by 2008, only 26% of divorce cases in Maricopa County, AZ, had this 
small amount of parenting time ordered. In addition to the 22% with essentially equal cus-
tody awards reported earlier, another 45% specified 15–35% of time, and another 7% spec-
ified 35–45% of the child’s time with the father (Venohr & Kaunelis, 2008). 
Few custody or parenting time decrees result from litigation. The vast majority (more 
than 90%; Braver & O’Connell, 1998; Logan, Walker, Horvath, & Leukefeld, 2003; Maccoby 
& Mnookin, 1992) do not result from litigation but merely incorporate terms the parents 
have agreed on. It nonetheless seems likely that settlement terms reflect not only the par-
ents’ respective preferences but also what they think the court would do if they did not 
settle (in Mnookin & Kornhauser’s, 1979, phrase, they bargain “in the shadow of the law”). 
The typical settlement might thus contain very different terms if the prevailing legal rule 
were either the Equal Custody Presumption, or the Approximation Rule, rather than the 
BIS. 
There appears to be very substantial public opinion support for an Equal Custody pre-
sumption. For example, 85% of Massachusetts voters voted Yes on a nonbinding proposi-
tion that appeared on the 2004 ballot that said that there should be a: 
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Presumption in child custody cases in favor of joint physical and legal custody, 
so that the court will order that the children have equal access to both parents as 
much as possible, except where there is clear and convincing evidence that one 
parent is unfit, or that joint custody is not possible due to the fault of one of the 
parents.2 
 
Fabricius et al. (2010) presented the identical language to a group of citizens in the Pima 
County, Arizona, jury pool (using similar instructions to that of the current studies, but 
with a different pool of respondents), asking them to indicate their agreement with it on a 
7-point Likert scale. Fifty-seven percent chose the strongest level of agreement (“7” on the 
scale), with another 30% just below that (6 on the scale), a very strong endorsement of the 
proposition. They also found no significant differences by gender, age, education, income, 
whether the respondents themselves were currently married, had ever divorced, had chil-
dren, had paid or received child support, or by their political outlook. Recent polls in Can-
ada (which has similar custody laws) conducted by Nanos Research and commissioned by 
its Parliament have found similar consensus (http://www.familylawwebguide.com.au/forum/ 
pg/topicview/misc/4171/index.php&keep_session_2049584127). 
 
Polls versus Actual Decisions 
 
Clearly, there is a very sizable gap between current popular views strongly favoring equal 
custody, as reflected in polls and votes on custody allocation, and actual legal outcomes, 
in which it is awarded only in a distinct minority of cases. One way of explaining the chasm 
is that it reflects difficulties with equal custody arrangements that policymakers and judges 
appreciate but which the general public fails to recognize. 
There is, for example, a voluminous empirical literature comparing custody arrange-
ments (including Bauserman’s 2002 meta-analysis that is favorable to joint custody but 
highly disputed; Bruch, 2006; Emery, Randy, Otto, & O’Donohue, 2005) and many review-
ers (but far from all) read it to say that equal custody is unlikely to be a good idea in con-
tested cases. Among the common arguments opposing it, Gardner (1982) argues that the 
constant back and forth of equal custody is wearing on both parents and children, and 
perhaps “confusing” and destabilizing as well for the children. Critics also argue that it is 
better for the children to maintain the child-rearing division previously in place (as in the 
Approximation Rule), and that equal custody is logistically difficult or impossible in many 
cases (Albiston, Maccoby, & Mnookin, 1990), as well as patently unfair to the parent who 
has sacrificed for the children (Scott & Derdyn, 1984; Singer, 1988). Thus, either parent’s 
objection to it is sufficient reason for the judge to reject it. Most important in the eyes of 
critics are cases of abuse or highly destructive conflict between the parents, where equal 
custody might simply be unworkable (Amato, 1993; Buchanan & Jahromi, 2007; Emery, 
1999). 
The large discrepancy between the measures of popular support for joint custody (polls 
and votes on ballot propositions), and its relatively low frequency among actual custody 
arrangements, could thus be explained as reflecting difficulties that are apparent to judges, 
custody evaluators and legislators but are not obvious to survey respondents and voters. 
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An alternative explanation is that there is a difference between expressing a view on an 
abstract proposition of principle, and deciding an actual case. A principle like equality is 
unlikely to draw much opposition in the abstract, but an actual case may present compli-
cations and difficulties that prevent its application. The large gap between the support for 
equal custody in polls and ballot measures, and the frequency with which judges in fact 
endorse it, might reflect just this difference. The difference between judges and poll re-
spondents, if that is true, does not arise from a difference in values or understandings of 
what is best for children, but rather from a difference in the two groups’ senses of when 
those values can be realized. Voters and poll respondents, in other words, gives answers 
that reflect aspirations, which those more experienced in custody disputes know are often 
unrealistic. 
A question thus was whether the popular support prior studies seemed to show for 
equal custody would persist when lay respondents were given case details, rather than 
only abstract principles. Perhaps the ideal way to gain insight into whether this explana-
tion is correct would be to ask lay people their view of the appropriate resolution in actual 
past custody cases, with full presentation of the kind of facts that raise difficulties that 
concern many judges and custody evaluators. Such an approach is, of course, unwieldy 
with the kinds of lay respondents to which we had access. Instead, we wrote up case sum-
maries, as a custody evaluator might do for a judge, albeit in a relatively simplified form 
that would be accessible to lay respondents in a reasonable time frame. The stories we 
presented our respondents, while necessarily over-simplified and hypothetical, were also 
not unrealistic. The vignette shown to one group of respondents was rather uncomplicated 
and gave them little basis for favoring one parent over the other, but it could still tell us 
whether the support for equal custody found in polls is also present when respondents are 
asked to decide a case. The vignettes shown to other groups of respondents had facts that 
would lead to different results if one applied an Equal Custody Presumption than if one 
applied the Approximation Rule; our interest was in learning whether our respondents, 
told only to do what they thought best for the child, would in fact render decisions sug-
gesting a preference for one rule or the other. 
 
Study 1 
 
Study 1 asked our respondents to make judgments in varying case vignettes (much as in a 
long line of studies in psychology and law; see Brewer & Williams, 2005, for examples). 
Because judges (not jurors) make custodial assignments, we asked them to imagine they 
were a judge deciding these cases.3 To assess the public’s judgments about the Equal Cus-
tody presumption and the Approximation Rule, we asked people their view of the best 
custodial arrangement under an otherwise neutral and identical set of facts but in which 
past child care-giving patterns varied across three different vignettes. In one vignette, the 
mother provided 75% of the couple’s predivorce child care-giving duties, in another the 
father provided 75% of the couple’s predivorce child care-giving duties, and in the third 
they were described as having divided the predivorce child care 50-50. It is important to 
note that all three vignettes specified that neither parent wanted equal custody, but were 
instead each requesting “as much living time with the children” as possible because “each 
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now genuinely feels the children would be better off mostly in their care and not so much 
in the care of the other parent. They disagree strongly about this.” Recalling that only rarely 
would (or could) a judge order equal custody over the objection of even one of the parents, 
even our 50-50 scenario would hardly ever elicit an equal custody award in a real dispute. 
Whatever support we found for equal custody in the 50-50 scenario, we expected to find 
less when we gave our respondents facts under which one or the other parent provided 
three-fourths of the child care before the parents’ separation. Because these vignettes put 
the Approximation Rule and the Equal Custody presumption in conflict, we expected the 
results to shed light on how respondents would judge each rule. 
 
Method 
 
Respondent pool and survey distribution 
The respondent pool and survey distribution closely resembled that of the study by Ellman, 
Braver, and MacCoun (2009), and by Braver (2007, 2008). The respondents were from the 
Pima County (Tucson, Arizona) jury panel. Those summoned to serve on a jury panel are 
citizens chosen from the voter and driver’s license records. Using a computer generated 
random selection process, the jury panel is chosen so as to represent a representative cross-
section of the adult citizens in the county. Of those who are summoned by the county jury 
commissioner, over 90% eventually appear (Ellman, Braver, & MacCoun, 2009). Because 
exemptions from jury service are only rarely granted and because of stringent enforcement 
and penalties, Pima County jury pools show less self-selection and bias than jury pools in 
some other jurisdictions. For the current studies, surveys were distributed on two separate 
occasions. The survey was of course voluntary. Of the 817 jurors present at both occasions 
combined and offered the survey, 252 chose not to take a survey form and the remaining 
565 surveys were accepted. Of these 565, 367 were completed (103 of these for Study 1, the 
remainder for Study 2), 171 were not completed because the respondent was called for jury 
service, 3 were not completed because the respondent left for lunch, 6 were abandoned by 
the respondent, and for 18 more, the respondent ultimately refused to complete it. Thus, 
the participation rate (excluding those prevented from completing by being called to jury 
or lunch) was 367/(817 – 171 – 3) = 57%, a bit less than the rate found by Ellman, Braver, 
and MacCoun (2009). Females composed 55% of the responding sample; 60% were cur-
rently married; 36% had ever been divorced; 65% had children; and the median age was 
51. Nineteen percent of the sample had no more than a high school graduation, while 20% 
had more than a college degree. The median household income was $45,000. Past studies 
using this identical method and jury pool and obtaining approximately this response rate 
have found that the ultimate sample responding to the survey closely matches Census data 
for the national population in age distribution, level of education achieved, and household 
income. 
This was a between-subjects design: different versions of the survey were distributed 
such that different jurors randomly received different surveys and the respondent was 
asked about just one of these vignettes. All versions began with the following stage setting 
instructions. 
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The first part of this survey is about child and family law after divorce. When a 
married couple with children gets a divorce, a decision needs to be made about 
where the children will live. If the two parents can’t agree about this, the courts 
or judges will make this decision. We want you to put yourself into the role of 
the judge in the following stories in which the two parents are in the process of 
getting a divorce and they don’t agree about what the living arrangements 
should be for their two school aged children. Please read the following stories 
very carefully and try to imagine yourself sitting on the bench in a courtroom 
needing to decide about what should be done about the couple’s disagreement 
and trying to decide as wisely as possible. You should also assume that there is 
nothing in the law itself that gives strong guidance; every case needs to be de-
cided on its own merits based on what is best for the child. There is no right or 
wrong answer; just tell us what you think is right. 
 
The next paragraphs describe the family, and then the family’s breakup: 
 
The evidence presented to you shows that in many respects, this appears to be a 
pretty average, normal family. For example, there are no indications about emo-
tional or mental problems, drug or alcohol problems, domestic violence or phys-
ical or sexual abuse on the part of either parent. There is nothing suggesting that 
either one lacks “fitness” as a parent. Most of the marriage was without unusual 
conflict and the family life was quite average. The two children both appear to 
be normally adjusted, doing neither particularly well nor particularly poorly in 
school and otherwise. Additional evidence shows that both parents deeply love 
the two kids and are both reasonably good parents who are involved in their 
children’s lives about like average families. 
[The second paragraph, which varied across survey versions, goes here. Its 
variations are described below.] 
The marriage became lost when both parents began to feel that the other was 
not living up to expectations as a husband or wife. They decided to seek marriage 
counseling, but it did not help or change either person’s mind about giving up 
on the marriage. So the divorce is proceeding. 
Since the separation, there has been relatively little conflict between the mother and 
the father. Both try especially hard never to argue in front of the children. Evidence shows 
that neither says bad things about the other to the children. Also neither tries to gain the 
loyalty of the children for themselves nor to undermine the other’s authority or relation-
ship with the children. They are both trying to make the best of the current situation. 
Each now genuinely feels the children would be better off mostly in their care 
and not so much in the care of the other parent. They disagree strongly about 
this, and as a result are asking you, the judge, to decide for them, understanding 
that each parent now wants as much living time with the children as you see fit 
to grant. Each one would be able and willing to make whatever adjustments to 
their work and living situation is necessary to accommodate whatever level of 
living time with the children you, as judge, see fit to order. 
B R A V E R  E T  A L . ,  P S Y C H O L O G Y ,  P U B L I C  P O L I C Y ,  A N D  L A W  1 7  (2 0 11 )  
11 
The different versions of the second paragraph described the amount of time each par-
ent spent with the children. About one third of the respondents read the following 50-50 
scenario: 
 
During the marriage, both parents worked full-time (M–F, 9-to-5). The children 
currently stay in an after-school program. During the marriage, Father took them 
to school in the mornings, and Mother picked them up, since she got home a few 
minutes earlier. The family had dinner together and both parents did bedtime 
routines with the children. Mother and Father were equally likely to stay home 
with an ill child. This actually happened only rarely. Likewise, they took turns 
taking the children to doctors’ and dentists’ appointments, depending on who 
could get time off. Father was more involved with each of the children’s sports 
activities, soccer and T-ball, and Mother was more involved with school activi-
ties. Mother went to approximately the same number of the children’s activities 
as Father. On the weekends the children spent about the same amount of time 
with each parent. On Saturday afternoons Father often spent time doing chores 
or with his friends. On Sunday afternoons Mother often spent time doing chores 
or with her friends. It can be said that, overall, the time spent parenting the chil-
dren during the marriage was split 50% with Mother and 50% with Father. 
 
The remaining respondents read a vignette in which either the mother or the father was 
said to have provided most (75%) of the child care predivorce. Shown below is the lan-
guage when the father provided more childcare, with the substitutions needed for the al-
ternate vignette shown in brackets [ ]. 
 
Both parents had jobs at which they worked during the entire marriage, but they 
mutually decided early on that because mother [father] had more earning poten-
tial, she [he] should spend more time on her [his] job than the father [mother]. 
So, since father [mother] has always worked somewhat shorter hours, he [she] 
takes them to school in the mornings and picks them up at 5 pm from the after-
school program they stay in. Mother [Father] leaves for work earlier and gets 
home from work at 6:30. Then the family normally had dinner together and both 
parents did bedtime routines with the children. Father [Mother] was more likely 
to stay home with an ill child, though on occasion mother [father] did. This ac-
tually happened only rarely. Father [Mother] took the children to most doctors’ 
and dentists’ appointments, and was more involved than mother [father] with 
each of the children’s sports activities, soccer and T-ball, and school activities. 
Father [Mother] went to about three of the children’s activities for every one that 
Mother [Father] was able to go to. On the weekends the children spent most of 
their time with Father [Mother]. Mother [Father] usually worked part of the 
weekend, and each parent took a few personal hours to do chores or see friends. 
It can be said that, overall, the time spent parenting the children during the mar-
riage was split 75% with Father [Mother] and 25% with Mother [Father]. 
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After reading the vignette, the respondent was prompted to answer two questions: 
1. What would YOU decide if you were judge? 
2. What do you think WILL happen if the description above was a real family 
in today’s courts and legal environment? 
 
The possible responses were choices along a 9-point scale that was the same for both 
questions. The amount of time allocated to the father increased as one moved from choice 
1 to choice 9, while time allocated to the mother decreased equivalently over the same 
progression. The midpoint, (5), was labeled “Live equal amounts of time with each par-
ent.” Points 1 through 4 specified that the children should “live with the mother,” with the 
father’s share of the time described as: (1) minimally or not at all; (2) some; (3) a moderate 
amount; (4) a lot. Points 6 through 9 called for the children to “live with the father” with 
an equivalent description of the time allocated to the mother that decreased as one moved 
from choice 6 to choice 9. Our respondents thus told us the amount of time they thought 
the children should spend with each parent, given the information presented in the vignette. 
The response choices were the same as those used in previous studies of living arrange-
ments (Fabricius & Hall, 2000; Fabricius et al., 2010). 
In the final (demographic) section of the survey, the respondents were asked about their 
gender, marital status, if they have children, whether they had ever paid or received child 
support, education, age, income, and political stances. 
 
Results 
 
The percentage responses for the two main items (what they would decide if they were 
judge; and what they think will happen if the description above was a real family in today’s 
courts and legal environment) are shown in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. As Figure 1 shows, 
for the 50-50 scenario, 69% of respondents thought living time should be divided equally 
between the parents. Virtually all the remaining citizens responded “Live with mother, 
spend a lot of time with dad.” 
Surprisingly, Figure 1 also shows that equal time with each parent was also the most 
preferred alternative in both 75-25 scenarios, selected by just less than half the respondents 
in each case. In both cases the alternative chosen second most often favored the parent who 
had provided 75% of the child care before separation, although the other parent was still 
allocated “a lot” of time (choices 4 and 6 on our scale): when mother has been primary 
caretaker, 41% chose her as the primary custodian after divorce; when father had been the 
primary caretaker, 37% chose him as the primary custodian after divorce. No response 
other than 4, 5, or 6 was chosen by more than 12% of the respondents to the 75-25 vignettes. 
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Figure 1. Percent selecting each postdivorce living arrangement “If They Were the Judge.” 
 
To assess whether respondents’ choice distributions were statistically different depend-
ing on the predivorce split of care-giving, an analysis of variance was conducted. The means 
of the responses to the question asking what they would decide if they were judge are 
shown in the first row of Table 1 (4.34, 4.75, and 5.63, for mother 75%, 50-50 and father 
75%, respectively). These are significantly different, F(2, 100) = 31.29, p < .01, and subse-
quent analyses showed every one was significantly different (at p < .05) from every other 
by Tukey test.4 Thus, while our respondents’ principal preference was for equal residential 
custody, they significantly shifted the custodial time in the direction favored by the Ap-
proximation Rule when child care had not been equally shared before separation. 
 
Table 1. Mean Judgments, Study 1, by Predivorce Child Care-Giving Scenario and Perspective 
(If I Were Judge vs. What WILL Happen) 
 Predivorce child care giving  
 Mother 75% Equal Father 75% Average 
If I Were Judge 4.34 4.75 5.63 4.91 
What Will Happen 3.09 3.82 4.30 3.74 
Average 3.72 4.29 4.97  
Note: The higher the mean value, more parenting time for Dad is being awarded. Equal time with each parent = 5. 
 
But their shift was not nearly as large as called for by the Approximation Rule; that is, 
the same postdivorce division of child-care time as had been in place predivorce. We can 
ascertain this because the results in Fabricius et al., (2010) allow us to map the scale used 
here onto identifiable percentages of parenting time. That study asked divorced parents 
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and their children both to describe their custodial arrangements with the same 9-point 
used scale here, and also to answer a set of other detailed questions describing exactly the 
allocation of parenting days. The two measures were highly correlated. Most importantly, 
respondents who indicated a residential arrangement in which the father had the child 
25% of the time also chose the label “Live with mother, see father a moderate amount (3).” 
Using the Fabricius et al. results to interpret our data thus suggests that a value of about 3 
on our scale is equivalent to awarding the mother 75% time, and the value 7 was equivalent 
to awarding the father 75% time (this of course requires an assumption that people in the 
present study interpret the percentages in the same manner as those in the previous study). 
Using this scale, it seems that the mean shift, while significant, t(33) = 19.49, p < .01 for the 
father with 25% predivorce time; t(33) = –21.40, p < .01 for the mother with 25% predivorce 
time) did not result in anything near the 75/25 time allocation that a strict application of 
the Approximation Rule would require. Thus, while citizens did indeed prefer to award 
more time to the parent who provided the majority of the child-care, the time awarded fell 
very far short of the split of care-giving during the predivorce period as specified by the 
Approximation Rule. 
Figure 2 shows that our respondents believed the cases would come out differently “in 
today’s legal system” than they would prefer. Only 28% thought the parents in an actual 
case would be allocated equal living time, even when they had divided child-care duties 
equally preseparation. This was about the same percentage that predicted equal custody 
when the father had provided the majority of predivorce child-care duties in an actual case. 
When the mother had provided most of the preseparation child care, only 21% thought 
equal custody would be ordered in an actual case. Perhaps most interesting of all, while 
none of our respondents thought the father would get primary custody when the mother 
had provided most of the child care before their separation, 24% thought the mother would 
get primary custody when the father had provided most of the preseparation child care. 
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Figure 2. Percent believing each postdivorce living arrangement would prevail in “To-
day’s Courts and Legal Environment.” 
 
The means of these responses are also shown in Table 1, in the second row. To ascertain 
whether all the judgments differed significantly, we conducted a two-factor mixed Analy-
sis of Variance, with three levels of predivorce child caregiving Scenario, and two levels of 
the repeated measures factor of Perspective (“If I Were Judge” vs. “What Will Happen”). 
The main effect of Scenario showed the three were significantly different, F(2, 100) = 29.16, 
p < .001. When fathers had provided the majority of predivorce child-care, the mean re-
sponse (averaged over both Perspectives) was 4.97, very close to the response “equal time 
with each parent” (= 5). This mean response dropped significantly for the 50-50 Scenario, 
to 4.29, and dropped again significantly, to 3.72, for the Scenario where the mother had 
provided most of the predivorce child care. 
The main effect of Perspective was also highly significant, F(1, 100) = 66.24, p < .001, 
while the interaction between Perspective × Scenario was not significantly different, how-
ever, F(2, 100) = .93, p = .40. Combined, these two tests show that the respondents believed 
the current legal system would be 1.2 units more inclined toward maternal custody than 
they themselves believed appropriate, and this difference was constant over scenario. 
 
Effects of demographic variables on judgments 
Another analysis was completed incorporating gender as a second between-group factor. 
There was a significant main effect of the gender of the respondent, F(1, 90) = 13.29, 
p < .001. While significance was not obtained for either the triple interaction of Gender × 
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Scenario × Perspective, F(2, 90) = .24, p = .79, nor the Gender × Scenario two-factor interac-
tion, F(2, 90) = .14, p = .87, it was obtained for the Gender × Perspective interaction, F(1, 90) 
= 6.17, p = .02. The means for the above interaction are shown in Table 2. Further probing 
of this significant interaction with simple main effect tests disclosed that the genders did 
not differ in terms of what they would do if they were judge, F(1, 90) = .81, p = .37 (M = 4.84 
vs. 4.98), but they did differ significantly in terms of what they felt would happen, F(1, 90) 
= 12.91, p < .01, with female respondents believing that fathers would get more parenting 
time awarded (M = 4.16) than male respondents thought (M = 3.31), but for both genders, 
significantly in the direction of mother primary custody, that is, significantly less than the 
value 5 that would imply equal custody, female respondents: t(63) = –6.54, p < .01; male 
respondents: t(33) = –6.89, p < .01. 
 
Table 2. Mean Judgments, Study 1, by Gender and Perspective 
 Male Female Average 
If I Were Judge 4.84 4.98 4.91 
What Will Happen 3.31 4.16 3.74 
Average 4.08 4.57  
Note: The higher the mean value, more parenting time for Dad is being awarded. Equal time with each parent = 5. 
 
A number of demographic variables other than gender were obtained from respond-
ents: whether they were married*, whether they had ever been divorced*, whether they 
had children*, whether they had ever paid child support*, whether they had been ordered 
to receive child support*, their age, their education, their household income, and their po-
litical outlook. We examined whether each of them correlated with each of the two Per-
spective judgments (“If I Were Judge” and “What Will Happen”) for each of the three 
Approximation Rule Scenarios, a total of 54 correlation coefficients (the dichotomous var-
iables above—those marked with “*”—were all “dummy coded,” so that positive correla-
tions imply that respondents who answered yes to the item made judgments awarding 
more parenting time to Dad). Only three of the 54 were significant, a number that could 
easily have occurred by chance. (The three were: Mother 75%: If I Were Judge with house-
hold income, r(31) = .39, p = .03; Father 75%: What Will Happen with whether married, 
r(32) = .38, p = .04, What Will Happen with political outlook, r(30) = –.43, p = .02 [for this 
correlation, the more liberal the political outlook, the more time awarded to Dad]). 
 
Discussion 
 
A plurality of our respondents preferred equal custody in all three conditions. In that sense, 
the results with case vignettes replicate the public support for equal custody found in the 
Massachusetts ballot proposition and the Arizona and Canadian polls that asked about 
abstract principles, and disconfirms the idea that the only difference between the general 
public and actual decision-makers is their differential possession of factual details; differ-
ential values remains a possibility. On the other hand, the proportion of our respondents 
favoring equal custody was considerably lower than among the Massachusetts voters (85%) 
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and the respondents in Fabricius et al. (2010) (87%), suggesting that focusing the attention 
of respondents on the details of a particular custody dispute does reduce somewhat their 
support for equal custody. 
Moreover, the amount of the fall-off was related to the predivorce child care arrange-
ments described in the vignette: fewer favored equal custody when either the mother or 
father had performed most of the child care during the marriage, with the mean response 
of our respondents shifting in the direction of the preseparation child care arrangements. 
The decline in support for equal custody (from 69% of our respondents, to 47 and 46%) 
was significant, showing that on average our respondents judged that the preseparation 
parenting arrangements should influence the postseparation custody order. This suggests 
that many of our respondents implicitly applied a substantially weakened version of the 
Approximation Rule. 
It is also important to note that there was no difference between male and female re-
spondents in their judgment of what should happen in these cases. Nonetheless, a bit of 
gender preference appears evident in the responses of both genders for the 50-50 vignette. 
Of those who did not select the “equal living” alternative, far more (28%) favored maternal 
primary custody than paternal (3%), a huge and significant difference, t(35) = –3.0, p = .01. 
Whether or not some of our respondents were gender-biased, however, it seems they 
believed that the legal system was. They predicted that the court system would award 
custody far more favorably to mothers than they themselves believed appropriate. Of par-
ticular note, they expected the system to award primary custody to mothers even in the 
50-50 case in which the parents were equal caretakers during the marriage: only 28% of 
our respondents thought the system would award equal custody in these cases, as com-
pared to the 69% who themselves would. And while only 5% would give primary custody 
to the mother when the father had been the primary caretaker during the marriage, half 
thought the system would, more than the proportion (24%) who thought the system would 
give the father primary custody. (Thirty-seven percent of our respondents would give fa-
ther primary custody in this case.) These findings may explain the earlier reported finding 
that 83% of respondents in a survey believed the “divorce system” slanted in favor of 
mothers (Fabricius et al., 2010). The current study also found that males perceived more 
maternal bias in the courts than did females, because men predicted that fathers would get 
less parenting time awarded (M = 4.16) than female respondents thought (M = 3.31). 
This perception of what the legal system would do is important because a party’s liti-
gation choices might well be based on what they or their lawyers believe courts will do, 
regardless of whether those beliefs are accurate. Rational actors are less likely to bear the 
costs of litigation when they believe their chance of success is less, so we might expect 
rational fathers who believed the system to be biased toward mothers to concede maternal 
custody claims more often than fathers who did not have this belief. Similarly, rational 
mothers who believe the system favors them may resist paternal claims for primary or 
equal custody more often than those who believed the system unbiased. The overall result 
one would therefore expect is that settlements in custody disputes will favor maternal cus-
tody more often than they would if the parents believed the system were not biased. This 
suggests that whether or not the system is in fact biased toward mothers (a claim our data 
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does not address) the mere perception that there is bias may influence the settlements on 
which most of the judgments are based, a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
Summary 
 
While the results here may be said to offer some support for an Approximation Rule prin-
ciple, any fair assessment would need to conclude that much greater public support was 
found for the Equal Custody presumption. In fact, it proved surprisingly difficult to move 
respondents from the view that equal living time was preferred, and when they did so move, 
it was nearly always to the very next scale point, “a lot” of time to the secondary parent. 
Thus, contrary to our speculation, lay endorsement of equal custody does not seem to di-
minish much when some factual details of the case are provided, even when those same 
facts would move actual decision-makers to a far different arrangement. 
What the Study 1 data do not clearly tell us is the implicit reason for the inclination of 
lay decision-makers to favor equal custody. Under the facts of the vignette cases, because 
both parents were presented as capable, the child’s interests might not seem to weigh too 
heavily in the balance. Given such facts, respondents influenced by cultural norms of gen-
der-role equality may believe that an equal division of parenting time is the result that is 
most fair to the parents. If they also see little reason to worry that equal time would some-
how sacrifice the children’s interests, they might well decide that fairness to the parents is 
the best available basis for resolving the dispute. 
But what if we posed questions with facts more likely to suggest problems with an equal 
time custodial arrangement? Would our respondents then move further from equal time, 
sacrificing this possible fairness concern to protect the children’s interest? We sought to 
explore that possibility with the vignettes we posed to our respondents in Study 2. 
 
Study 2 
 
Perhaps the most important circumstance that would keep most real decision-makers from 
an equal custody allocation is parental conflict. Studies have consistently found that high 
levels of inter-parental conflict are associated with child maladjustment, not only in divorced 
families but also in intact families (Davies & Cummings, 1994; Grych & Fincham, 1990). 
The natural conclusion is that a custody arrangement that exposes the child to less inter-
parental conflict is better than one with more, such as an equal custody arrangement im-
posed on parents who are repeatedly in conflict with one another. Indeed, the conventional 
wisdom among experts is that in divorces with high levels of inter-parental conflict (what-
ever the past care-giving arrangements), children are better off with a custodial arrange-
ment allocating primary custody to one parent and limited visitation to the other, than 
with custody arrangements in which the parents are forced to interact more. In such situ-
ations, decision-makers often believe they must somehow choose the “best” parent and more 
or less discard the other. For example, Stahl (1999) in his guide for professional custody 
evaluators opines “high conflict parents cannot share parenting” (p. 99). Similarly, Buchanan 
(2001) writes “when parents remain in high conflict, joint custody is . . . ill-advised” (p. 234). 
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Presenting our respondents with vignettes describing parents deeply embroiled in con-
flict tested whether their inclination toward equal custodial time would persist even under 
circumstances in which it is clear most professionals would make a different choice, even 
though both parents were also described as good parents.5 If our respondents shared the 
views of experts that sole physical custody awards are better for children when the parents 
are in conflict, they should move toward that result, given the instructions that their deci-
sion should be “based on what is best for the child.” Study 2 probes this question by asking 
respondents to assign living arrangements in both high- and low-conflict families. 
But we also chose to include in Study 2 additional conditions that examined the more 
nuanced views of inter-parental conflict that are beginning to be advocated. For example, 
Kelly and Emery (2002) argue that: 
 
although high conflict postdivorce is generally assumed to be a shared interac-
tion between two angry, culpable parents, our clinical, mediation, and arbitration 
experience in high conflict postdivorce cases indicates that it is not uncommon 
to find one enraged or defiant parent and a second parent who no longer harbors 
anger, has emotionally disengaged, and attempts to avoid or mute conflict that 
involves the child (p. 353). 
 
This suggests that to be realistic, we should include conflict vignettes in which only one 
of the parents is described as angry and vindictive. 
 
Method 
 
Study 2 closely followed the procedures and used the same respondent pool as Study 1. 
The response rates reported earlier, in fact, were for both studies combined. But in Study 
2, each respondent provided judgments for two scenarios, a low-conflict (baseline) sce-
nario, and a “Second Case” that varied randomly by condition. The low conflict scenario 
was almost identical to the 50-50 scenario described above in the Study 1. Its major differ-
ence was that it was relatively vague about the split of child care duties. In particular, the 
second paragraph of the Study 1 vignette that described the (varying by condition) time-
split was eliminated, and the last sentence of the first paragraph was correspondingly aug-
mented a bit to say both are “reasonably good parents who are involved in their children’s 
lives about like average families in which both parents work full-time (both M–F, 9-to-5).” (The 
difference in language is italicized.) Respondents then answered the same two questions of 
the Study 1. 
Next, a Second Case was presented in which another family was described, followed by 
the same two questions again. Respondents were told “Family B is the same as Family A 
in most respects” (and the “respects,” such as neither parent lacking fitness, were re-
peated.) But in place of the italicized paragraph of Study 1 was one of the following: 
 
High Mutual Conflict Condition 
What is different about this family is that since the separation, both parents have 
become and remain extremely angry at each other. So, at the present time, there 
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is a great deal of conflict between the parents. Evidence shows that the father 
and the mother initiate this conflict equally often by starting arguments with the 
other, mostly regarding the children. They pick these fights in front of the chil-
dren, and end up saying bad things about the other in front of the children. Nei-
ther parent really tries to suppress these arguments. It is clear that each also “bad 
mouths” the other to the children when the other isn’t around. Each parent tries 
to gain the loyalty of the children while trying to undermine the other parent’s 
authority and relationship with the children. 
 
Mother [Father] is Primary Instigator of the conflict 
What is different about this family is that since the separation, the mother [father] 
has become and remains extremely angry at the father [mother]. So, at the pre-
sent time, there is a great deal of conflict between the parents. Evidence shows 
that the mother [father] typically initiates this conflict by frequently starting ar-
guments with the father [mother], mostly regarding the children. She [he] picks 
these fights in front of the children, and ends up saying bad things about the 
father [mother] in front of the children. It is clear that she [he] also “bad mouths” 
the father [mother] to the children when he [she] isn’t around. She [he] tries to 
gain the loyalty of the children while trying to undermine the father’s [mother’s] 
authority and relationship with the children. Evidence shows that the father 
[mother] clearly feels it is best not to fight in front of the children and so tries to 
suppress mother’s [father’s] attempts at arguing. In addition he [she] is sure to 
not say bad things about the mother [father] to the children or to undermine her 
[him]. He [she] is trying hard to make the best of the current situation. 
 
Results 
 
The percentage responses for what they would decide if they were judge for the low and 
high mutual conflict situation is shown in Figure 3. The low conflict case of Study 2 elicited 
virtually the identical distribution of responses as the 50-50 condition of Study 1 (suggest-
ing that exactly equal splits of predivorce care-giving are not necessary to elicit this judg-
ment; “about average” splits do as well.) As in Study 1, about 2/3 selected equal living time 
and virtually all the remaining citizens responded “Live with mother, spend a lot of time 
with dad.” 
Perhaps more surprising about Figure 3, however, is that almost an identical percent-
age, 64%, selected equal living time even in the high mutual conflict vignette. Thus, the 
existence of high degrees of mutual conflict between the parents did not seem at all to deter 
our respondents, as it apparently does real-world decision-makers, from awarding equal 
custody. What did change in the high mutual conflict vignette were the responses of those 
who did not choose equal time. The percentage who favored primary maternal custody 
with “a lot” of time for dad declined substantially (from more than 30 to 5%) and the per-
centage who favored primary maternal custody with a “moderate” amount of time for Dad 
increased substantially (from 1% to nearly 20%). The combination of these two changes led 
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to a variance in the high conflict case that was significantly greater (by the Pitman, 1939, 
test) than in the low conflict case; but the means did not differ significantly, t(41) = .87, p = .39. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Percent selecting each postdivorce living arrangement “If They Were the Judge” 
by low or high (mutual) conflict. 
 
Figure 4 shows the responses to the same item, but includes the Mother Instigates and 
Father Instigates conditions, with the mutual High Conflict condition responses shown 
again for a point of reference. The additional information about who primarily instigates 
the conflict changes the responses radically, as can be seen, to award much more time to 
the innocent parent. For example, when conflict was mutual, 64% awarded equal time, but 
when father was the primary instigator, only 4% did so. 
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Figure 4. Percent selecting each postdivorce living arrangement “If They Were the Judge,” 
for high conflict cases, by who instigated the conflict. 
 
To assess whether the above distributions differed significantly by conflict instructions, 
an analysis of variance was conducted. The initial analysis was a three factor mixed Anal-
ysis of Variance, with the factors being Conflict Scenario, with three between group levels, 
and CaseType (Low Conflict Baseline First Case vs. Second Case) and Perspective (“If I 
Were Judge” vs. “What Will Happen”), both as two-level repeated measures factors. The 
means are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Mean Judgments, Study 2, by Conflict Scenario, CaseType, and Perspective 
 Mutual Mother instigates Father instigates Average 
Baseline low conflict     
     If I Were Judge 4.76 4.60 4.67 4.68 
     What WILL Happen 3.86 3.83 3.95 3.88 
Second CASE     
     If I Were Judge 4.60a 6.49a 2.76a  
     What WILL Happen 3.48b 4.89b 2.44a  
Note: The higher the mean value, more parenting time for Dad is being awarded. Means within a column that 
have different lowercase superscripts differ significantly by Tukey test. 
 
This analysis yielded a significant triple interaction, F(2, 141) = 7.89, p < .001. In accord-
ance with the advice of Keppel (1973) when encountering such a finding, we then probed 
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the significance of two “simple two way interactions.” The first was the 3 × 2, Conflict Sce-
nario by Perspective, within the Baseline Low Conflict case only (unshaded rows 1 and 2) 
and the second was the analogous analysis within the Second Case (shaded rows 3 and 4). 
For the first of these, the reader will note, the Baseline Low Conflict case is actually identi-
cal for all three conflict scenarios. As expected, accordingly, significance was found for 
neither the Conflict Scenario main effect, F(2, 142) = .32, p = .73, nor for the Conflict Scenario 
× Perspective interaction effect, F(2, 142) = .53, p = .59. Thus, this implies that for the Baseline 
Low Conflict case, identical for all Conflict Scenarios, the three “If I Were Judge” judg-
ments were all virtually identical (row 1 of Table 3). Similarly the three “What Will Hap-
pen” judgments were all virtually identical (row 2 of Table 3). However, for this Baseline 
Low Conflict case, the row 1 means differed from the row 2 means by about the same 
(substantial) amount. That this “substantial” amount was extremely significant was shown 
by the Perspective main effect, F(1, 142) = 74.79, p < .001. 
The second simple two-way analysis, however, yielded a highly significant simple two 
way interaction, F(2, 141) = 6.83, p < .001. This, together with the lack of a significant simple 
two way interaction in the proceeding simple analysis, is what accounts for the significant 
triple interaction. When a simple two-way interaction is significant, as it is here, Keppel 
(1973) recommends further probing with “simple simple main effect” analysis. This anal-
ysis showed that for the Second case (shaded rows), the Perspective effect was significant 
for two of the three Scenarios; the Father Instigates scenario was the nonsignificant one. 
These differences are shown in Table 3 with the superscripts in rows 3 and 4. (When the 
superscripts are different, the two means in the same column are significantly different by 
simple simple main effect test, F’s and p’s = 17.09, .001; 38.90, .001; 1.91, .17, respectively, 
all with df = 1, 141.) What these data tell us is that our respondents expected courts to agree 
with them that fathers who instigated conflict should be allocated less custody, but thought 
the courts would be more sympathetic than they themselves would be to mothers who 
instigated the conflict or who were involved in conflict that was mutual. 
Tukey tests were also conducted among the three means in both rows 3 and 4 of Table 
3, which showed that in each row every condition mean was significantly different than 
every other one. In other words, respondents felt that when conflict was primarily insti-
gated by one parent rather than mutually initiated, the instigating parent should get signif-
icantly less parenting time. Respondents also thought that judges would award custody 
less time to the parent who instigated the conflict than in the mutual conflict case. From 
inspection, it appears that the degree to which the instigating parent is “punished” is sim-
ilar for the two parents. In other words, respondents are not changing the degree to which 
they are “punishing” each parent based on the gender of the parent. 
 
Effects of demographic variables on judgments 
Adding the demographic variable of Gender into the analysis made it a four-factor mixed 
design. The only effects involving Gender that were significant were the Gender × Perspec-
tive interaction and the triple interaction of Gender × Perspective × CaseType. Notably, 
Gender never significantly interacted with Scenario (however, the quadruple interaction 
of Scenario × CaseType × Perspective × gender approached significance, F(2, 121) = 2.68, p 
= .07). The means for the significant interaction of Perspective × Gender (collapsing over 
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Scenarios) are presented in Table 4. As in the analogous Table 2 for Study 1, the genders 
did not differ in terms of what they would do if they were judge, F(1, 128) = 3.08, p = .08 
(M = 4.75 vs. 4.56), but they did differ significantly in terms of what they felt would happen, 
F(1, 125) = 3.94, p < .05, with female respondents believing that fathers would get more 
parenting time awarded (M = 3.98) than male respondents thought (M = 3.44). 
 
Table 4. Mean Judgments for Study 2, by Gender and Perspective 
 Male Female Average 
If I Were Judge 4.75 4.56 4.66 
What Will Happen 3.44 3.98 3.71 
Average 4.09 4.27  
Note: The higher the mean value, more parenting time for Dad is being awarded. 
 
Correlations were examined for the same demographic variables as in the Study 1. Cor-
relations were computed for each Scenario (including the Baseline Low Conflict) and Per-
spective with each demographic variable. In total, 72 correlations were examined; of those 
six were significant (Baseline Low Conflict Scenario: If I Were Judge with ever divorced, 
r(220) = .19, p < .01; If I Were Judge with ever had children, r(221) = .21, p < .01 (for the two 
previous correlations, respondents who answered yes to the item made judgments award-
ing more parenting time to Dad); If I Were Judge with age, r(216) = .22, p < .01 (for this 
correlation the younger the respondent, the more time awarded to dad); Mutual Conflict 
Scenario: If I Were Judge with higher education level, r(39) = .39, p = .02, If I Were Judge 
with higher household income, r(38) = .41, p = .01, What Will Happen with political outlook, 
r(37) = –.42, p = .01 (for this correlation the more liberal the political outlook the more time 
awarded to Dad). Again the number of significant correlations compared to the number 
computed and examined was low. 
 
Discussion 
 
Study 2 compared our respondents’ assessment of the appropriate custody arrangement 
in our baseline case (little conflict between two parents who are both competent and car-
ing) to their assessment of several versions of high-conflict cases that were otherwise iden-
tical. Nearly 70% of respondents in the low conflict case supported equal living time (even 
though the splits of care-giving predivorce were described this time as “about like average 
families in which both parents work full-time,” rather than exactly equal), although (as 
noted earlier) those who did not favor equal time chose primary maternal custody signifi-
cantly more often than paternal custody. As in Study 1, respondents also believed, on av-
erage, that the actual outcomes in today’s courts would favor mothers far more than the 
respondents themselves judged was proper. 
Surprisingly, the high degree of support for equal living time did not lessen when the 
respondents were told the parents were in constant conflict with one another, so long as 
they were said to be equally to blame for the conflict. However, the choices of the minority 
of respondents who did not choose equal living time were significantly more variable 
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when there was high mutual conflict. There was very little support for primary paternal 
custody in either condition. These results suggest that, while most respondents’ judgments 
were surprisingly unaffected by parental conflict, those that were affected dealt with their 
concern by reducing the father’s time with the children, not the mother’s. 
This public preference for equal custody even in the face of substantial but mutual con-
flict between the parents is far different from what experts and professionals typically rec-
ommend or decide. Courts generally favor custody arrangements in high conflict cases 
that minimize parental interaction, which means (to most courts) that equal time awards 
are disfavored. Based on their sensitivity to the detrimental effects of conflict on children, 
courts instead tend to choose a primary custodian, and substantially limit the time of the 
other with the child. This seems to stand as a genuine difference in lay versus court values, 
not easily reconciled with the more benign interpretations of the “chasm” we offered earlier. 
Particularly interesting are the high-conflict cases in which one rather than both parents 
is at fault. When told that just one parent was to blame for the conflict, the proportion 
favoring equal living time drops dramatically, greatly reducing the parenting time of the 
culpable parent. Moreover, in both cases, the largest proportion would allow the instigat-
ing parent only a “moderate” amount of time with the child, rather than “a lot,” further 
increasing the magnitude of the shift away from the equal living time preference most re-
spondents had when the conflict was both parents’ fault. 
In summary, conflict alone hardly affects our respondents’ judgments at all, but conflict 
for which one parent alone is largely to blame very much does. Why do our respondents 
make such a sharp distinction, much more than real decision-makers would, between the 
case in which conflict is mutual (2/3 favoring equal time) and the cases in which the mother 
or father is alone responsible for it (20 and 5% favoring equal time, respectively)? We doubt 
that neither custody professionals and judges nor our respondents believe equal time is 
better for the child in the mutual conflict case than in the unilateral conflict case. So, we 
seek a different explanation for their disparate treatment of these two kinds of cases. 
One possibility could arise from the respondents’ commitment to gender role equality, 
which would in turn lead them to the view that parents who are in essentially similar sit-
uations ought, for reasons of fairness, be treated similarly. This principal would apply 
mainly in the mutual conflict case, which gives little or no basis for choosing one parent 
over the other as the primary custodian. To award one parent primary custody thus seems 
more arbitrary to our respondents than it might, for example, to professionals who might 
be more committed than our respondents to the belief that it is important to avoid equal 
time with high-conflict parents, and who could, when faced with having to render a rec-
ommendation or a decision, search further for some ground of difference between the par-
ties, perhaps small but not irrelevant, in their parenting skills or their relationship with the 
child. 
By contrast, when told the conflict is largely the fault of one of the parents, our respond-
ents are given a basis for choosing between them that is not arbitrary. When the blame can 
all be put on one parent, then the respondent may believe both criteria point in the same 
direction: the cooperative parent in fairness deserves more custody time than the instigating 
parent, and also equal-custody is not in the child’s interests when there is high conflict. 
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An equally plausible alternative possibility is that respondents took our description of 
the instigating parent to strongly imply that this is not a good parent, does not have good 
parenting skills, and that the other parent is in fact the better parent. As a result, their 
reasons for their judgments could be based simply on who they think is the better parent 
for the child. 
 
Overall Conclusions 
 
In both studies, the public’s inclination to favor equal time custody awards survived fac-
tual elaborations that would cause most courts and custody evaluators to reject them. It 
seems likely that this inclination to favor equal custody reflects, at least in part, an in-
creased cultural commitment over the past several decades to gender-role equality, just as 
the older tender years presumption reflected the different view of gender roles that our 
culture was committed to in earlier decades. Our respondents, both men and women, also 
believed that the courts were likely to render custody decisions that favored mothers in 
almost all instances more than our respondents believed appropriate (the only exception, 
in which the two Perspective judgments did not differ, was when Father was the Conflict 
Instigator). That is, our respondents seemed quite aware that the courts would reject equal 
custody in most of the situations in which they favored it. 
These studies yield several findings with important implications for family law. The 
first is that in most of the custody cases they were asked to decide, importantly including 
even the mutual high conflict divorces, our lay respondents made the judgment that equal 
custody was strongly preferred, a preference that current law does not generally allow un-
less the two parties agree to it. Further, lay people did not abandon this preference, as we 
anticipated they might, when factual details of the case were provided, even facts that 
would readily deter almost every actual decision-maker. Family lawmakers need to con-
front that equal custody enjoys genuinely great popularity among the citizenry. 
A second related finding is the flipside of that lay judgment: the apparently widespread 
belief, found in both studies, that the legal system will fashion custody awards far more 
favorably to mothers than the respondents, male and female, believe appropriate. Thus, if 
replicated, family lawmakers will also need to confront that current custody distributions 
are very unpopular, and contribute to (if not solely cause) the perception that the system 
is laden with bias in favor of mothers. This perception, we noted, was also shared by di-
vorce attorneys (Braver, Cookston, & Cohen, 2002). These findings may also suggest one 
reason why maternal custody is the arrangement specified in the great majority of custody 
arrangements in cases that settle: because the parties’ perceptions that courts favor moth-
ers (shared by males and females) will encourage settlements favorable to mothers even if 
the parties’ perceptions are inaccurate. 
It is also important to point out again what our findings don’t show (and in fact, do not 
even address): (1) How judges decide custody cases; (2) What is the “best” custody stand-
ard, BIS, Equal Custody or Approximation Rule? That Equal Custody seems far more pref-
erable to lay intuitions than current practice follows seems clear; that it is a better or wiser 
policy for children or families or society is a vastly different question our studies did not 
attempt to answer. Indeed, the current authors are not of one mind on this question. But 
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we do believe decision-makers need to recognize the widespread opposition to the current 
standards that award equal custody only rarely and, if those standards are nonetheless 
thought necessary, to be active in defending and justifying their preferences to the public. 
It could fairly be said that, at minimum, the family court has a big public relations problem. 
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Notes 
 
1. The term “joint physical custody” does not necessarily entail equal parenting time with each par-
ent; splits as disparate as 30 vs. 70% often are called joint physical custody (Kelly, 2007; Venohr 
& Griffith, 2005). 
2. This was the wording in 5 precincts, but slightly different language appeared in the rest of the 
state, and the vote was very similar for the two wordings http://www.boston.com/news/special/ 
politics/2004_results/general_election/questions_all_by_town.htm. 
3. It should be clearly noted that it was not our purpose to model the judgments actual jurists make; 
they are steeped in case law, see many cases for context, and only decide cases based on much 
richer, complete details then we gave our participants. 
4. Although it appears from the means that the shift toward more father time when the father had 
done most of the prior care-taking was greater than the shift toward more mother time when the 
mother had done more of it, in fact the test of this (the test of the quadratic trend) only approached 
significance, F(1, 100) = 3.04, p = .08. 
5. Parents that are “deeply embroiled in conflict” frequently both cast aspersions about the other 
parent’s parenting and character. Whether both are unambiguously “good parents” who “love 
their children” is thus an issue that judges frequently need to sort out during an actual custody 
trial. But it is not uncommon for the conclusion to be just that. 
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